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Motivation and synopsis of the new theory of time
1. The motivation for this theory is in (5). The A-series is the future/present/past series and includes 
becoming and is a different series for each different closed physical system, no matter how small. The 
B-series is the earlier-times to later-times ordering for each system. 
2. The mutual quantum observation of two systems with each other happens when and only when their 
respective A-series become the same A-series. 
This is not an ad hoc hypothesis but is the result of a philosophical exploration (see (5) below).
4. In spite of the names and analogies that will be used it is not assumed that Alice or Bob or 
experimenter E or Schrodinger's Cat, Cat, are macroscopic or conscious (to a human extent). These are 
all merely stand-in names for any two closed systems.
5. In Dualism there is, for two different systems Alice and Bob, no ontic state that contains specific 
values of both Alice’s qualia and Bob’s qualia. This is the philosophical observation that, in Dualism, 
there is simply no fact of the matter as to whether my subjective experience of 'red' is qualitatively the 
same as your subjective experience of 'red' when we each look at an apple that we each call 'red' [SEP 
1]. This is a somewhat common but extremely robust observation. This is a 'perspectival' ontology (see 
(9)). The A-series of a system is like (or is?) qualia. Thus the crux of this theory is to suppose there is 
no ontic state that contains specific values of both Alice’s A-series and Bob’s A-series in a single AB-
spacetime (see (6)) until mutual observation. 
6. Take, for example, an experimenter, E, and Schrodinger’s Cat, Cat. They do not share the same A-
series while the experiment is underway (the ‘now’ of E is not the ‘now’ of Cat, and the 'becoming' of E
is not the 'becoming' of Cat). Therefore during the experiment there is no time at which a contradiction 
in Cat's ascribed states arises.
7. What might be called McTaggartian spacetime, or AB-spacetime, has the five coordinates τ, the 
position of an event in the future/present/past of a selected system, t, the position of the event with 
respect to the ordering of earlier-times to later-times (which is relative for space-like separated events), 
and the three space coordinates xa. The four dimensions of Minkowski space, with its one dimension of 
time, t, is, in the viewpoint of this theory, outright incomplete. Also, Minkowski space from the point of
view of our experience is incomplete.
8. The B-series t is coordinatized by seconds, and the A-series τ is coordinatized by a unit of becoming 
e. (e is not the electric charge in this context.)
9. Later and later times become from the selected system’s future into its present and then into its past 
This does not assume the future is fixed.
10. One may envision islands of AB-spacetimes whose interfaces are quantum-mechanical.
11. If Alice’s A-series coordinate τ has a definite value then Bob’s A-series coordinate τ'' does not have 
a definite value and vice versa. This is the temporal analogy (equivalence?) to qualia in Dualism and is 
the crux of this theory.
There can be a ‘presentism function’ p(τ) that can define a non-point-like duration of the present (which
might be required by the Planck time anyway). If p(τ) is non-point-like then, when an experimental 
outcome happens in a system's present, there is uncertainty about the exact value of τ. In this case the 
value of τ'' of another system with its own presentism function p(τ'') need not be completely 
unrestricted, and we have some kind of uncertainty relation on our hands.
12. One may usefully define rates such as dx/dt, dx/dτ, dt/dτ, etc., where, for example, dx/dτ is the rate 
of change in position with respect to becoming from future to present to past in the A-series of the 
selected system, ignoring minus signs, and has units of meters/e.
13. There might be some metric on each island of AB-spacetime (here is just one example) such as 
(setting aside constants)
(∆sAB-spacetime)2 = + ∆τ2 – ∆t2 + ∆x2 + ∆y2 + ∆z2 
At the risk of belaboring a point, is worth reiterating that AB-spacetime has five not four coordinates.
14. It might be that there is an island of E and an island' of Cat, both from E’s ontological perspective, 
and analogous islands, island'', island''' both from Cat’s ontological perspective. It requires further study
to see if these two islands—from within a chosen perspective—have the same metric signature. But the
perspectives would still be comparable only via a quantum theory until mutual observation.
15. The probability pr(eA and B) of the actualization of an event eA and B when perspectives A an B come 
together is the probability of the event happening in perspective A, pr(eA) and the probability of that 
event happening from the perspective of B, pr(eB). Thus pr(eA and B) = pr(eA) × pr(eB).
16. The A-series variable τ and the B-series variable t can, depending on the situation, be varied 
independently. Therefore they cannot be the same temporal variable. Therefore any theory that aspires 
to be complete in some sense must account for both variables in one way or another.
For example, let W = w(t) be a worldline from an event e1 to a time-like separated event e2. Then it may
be, in a prototypical coordinization, that W becomes from the selected system's future, τ > 0, into the 
system's present, τ = 0, and then into the system's past, τ < 0 (generalizable by a presentism function 
p(τ)). Let the B-series duration of the propertime of W be [t]. Suppose for the sake of an example that it
takes 3 e for the B-series duration to become past the system's A-series present τ = 0. Then the 'rate of 
time' or 'the rate of the becoming of propertime' r = dt/dτ = [t]/3 in units of seconds/e, ignoring minus 
signs. It goes without saying that this gets modified with relativistic and other considerations.
On the other hand, suppose there is a time-like worldline W = w(t) from e3 which is at t = 0 to e4  which 
is at t = 14 seconds, so that in the B-series e3 < e4, such that e3 is in the selected system's past, τ < 0, and
e4  is in the system's present, τ = 0. Then suppose that after 1 e of A-series time the world line has 
evolved such that the event e4  is still in the system's present, but e4  = 28 seconds later than t = 0. Then 
the event e3 is now 28 seconds earlier than e4 , but e3  is only 1 e further into the system's past. Thus r = 
dt/dτ = 14 seconds/e, ignoring minus signs.   
17. The crux of this theory is (5) and leads directly to (2).
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